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Massive Modularity, Content
Integration, and Language
Collin Rice†‡
One of the obstacles facing massive modularity is how a pervasively modular mind
might generate non-domain-specific thoughts by integrating the content produced by
various domain-specific modules. Peter Carruthers has recently argued that the op-
erations of the language faculty are constitutive of the process by which the human
mind is able to integrate content from heterogeneous conceptual domains. In this article,
I first argue that Carruthers’s data do not provide support for either of two possible
interpretations of his thesis. In addition, I provide empirical and theoretical reasons
for thinking content integration is performed external to the language faculty.
1. Introduction. Carruthers (2006) presents an impressively extensive and
empirically thorough account of a massively modular mind. One of the
obstacles facing accounts of massive modularity is that modules are es-
sentially domain specific, yet our minds are able to integrate content from
almost any domain. For example, we have no problem thinking thoughts
such as, THE TOY IS IN THE CORNER WITH A LONG WALL ON THE LEFT
AND A SHORT BLUE WALL ON THE RIGHT, despite the integration of
concepts from object-property and geometric domains.1 This article fo-
cuses exclusively on Carruthers’s suggestion as to how a massively mod-
ular mind might integrate the content produced by various domain-specific
modules. Following his earlier work (Carruthers 2002), Carruthers argues
†To contact the author, please write to: University of Missouri, Department of Phi-
losophy, 435 Strickland Hall, Columbia, MO 65211; e-mail: crdv3@mail.missouri.edu.
‡I would especially like to thank Philip Robbins for his invaluable encouragement and
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also grateful to Peter Carruthers, Daniel
Weiskopf, Zac Ernst, and Tyler Kasperbauer for comments on earlier versions of this
work. In addition, I am indebted to Andre´ Ariew and Randall Westgren for their
continued support. This research was partially supported by the Al and Mary Agnes
McQuinn Chair in Entrepreneurial Leadership.
1. I will use small caps to denote concepts.
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that content integration is realized within the functions of the language
faculty (Chomsky 1968, 1975; Pinker 1997). In other words, Carruthers
believes that the operations of the language faculty are constitutive of the
process by which the human mind is able to integrate content from hetero-
geneous conceptual domains.
In this article, I argue that we have no empirical evidence in support
of Carruthers’s language-as-content-integrator (LACI) hypothesis, but we
do have some empirical and theoretical reasons against it. First, in section
2, I give two possible interpretations—a strong and a weak version—of
Carruthers’s hypothesis. In section 3, I examine the evidence cited by
Carruthers and show that it does not provide support for either version
of the LACI hypothesis. Then, in section 4, I present empirical evidence
against the strong version of Carruthers’s thesis and discuss why obtaining
empirical evidence concerning the weaker thesis is difficult. The final sec-
tion presents additional theoretical arguments for thinking that content
integration is performed external to the language faculty.
2. The Language-as-Content-Integrator Hypothesis. The language faculty,
classically considered, consists of distinct production and comprehension
subsystems. The production subsystem generates representations of nat-
ural language sentences from the outputs of central systems, which can
then be passed on to motor control systems so as to be expressed in
various ways. Conversely, the comprehension subsystem ‘decodes’ sen-
tences of a natural language into mental representations with the appro-
priate content. These mental representations can then be presented to
various central modules for processing.
Carruthers believes that the language faculty is capable of integrating
content in the following way. First, the output representations of two
distinct central modules are sent from the “central arena” (Barrett 2005)
to the language faculty. There, each is translated into representations of
natural language sentences, specifically what Chomsky referred to as Log-
ical Form (LF).2 Once the thoughts have been translated into this common
format, they can be integrated via an inference generator. This yields a
representation in LF with integrated content, which is then presented to
the comprehension subsystem, where it is decoded, resulting in a thought
with integrated content. Thus, the language faculty has produced a single
content-integrated thought from two domain-specific thoughts.
However, to accurately understand Carruthers’s proposal, we need to
understand what it means for content to become integrated in the intended
sense (Robbins 2002). One way to understand Carruthers’s intended sense
2. The LF of a sentence is a formal representation of its structure, which specifies its
logical role and properties.
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of content integration is as the use of a particular class of inferences,
namely, those licensed by natural language, that are capable of generating
a particular class of cross-modular thoughts. For instance, Carruthers
believes the language faculty is capable of taking an output from a geo-
metrical module (THE TOY IS IN THE CORNER WITH A LONG WALL ON
THE LEFT AND A SHORT WALL ON THE RIGHT) and an output from an
object-property module (THE TOY IS NEAR A RED WALL) and generating
the cross-modular thought: THE TOY IS IN THE CORNER WITH A LONG
WALL ON THE LEFT AND A SHORT red WALL ON THE RIGHT (Carruthers
2006, 241). This transition involves the ability to embed multiple adjectives
and phrases (i.e., there are additional ‘slots’ into which they can be in-
serted) and some method for indexing the reference of terms (e.g., the
short wall). Both of these operations are used by natural language.
Yet, there is another way to interpret Carruthers’s proposal. According
to the alternative interpretation, a thought will be content integrated just
in case it involves concepts from heterogeneous domains. This interpre-
tation extends the set of salient cross-modular thoughts to include all
those that involve concepts from more than one domain. This would
substantially strengthen Carruthers’s thesis to the claim that the operations
of the language faculty are constitutively involved in the generation of all
cross-modular thoughts. It is not entirely clear which thesis Carruthers
intends to endorse. Carruthers’s original article (2002) certainly suggests
that the content-integration capacities of the operations of the language
faculty ought to be understood in this stronger sense. For instance, Car-
ruthers claims, “The hypothesis, then, is that non-domain-specific, cross-
modular, propositional thought depends upon natural language. . . . Spe-
cifically, language is the vehicle of non-modular, non-domain specific,
conceptual thinking which integrates the results of modular thinking”
(666). However, in his more recent book, Carruthers frequently appears
to retreat to the weaker thesis (2006).
Given this ambiguity, I will simply refer to the thesis that the operations
of the language faculty are constitutive of the generation of all cross-
modular thoughts as the strong-LACI hypothesis. This, of course, con-
trasts with the weak-LACI hypothesis, which claims that the operations
of the language faculty are constitutively involved only in a limited set
of inferences (i.e., those licensed by natural language) that can be used
to generate a particular subset of cross-modular thoughts. With this dis-
tinction in place, the next section shows why Carruthers’s empirical evi-
dence is unable to support either version of the LACI hypothesis.
3. Disarming the Supposed Evidence. In critiquing Carruthers’s proposal,
it is important to note the relevant competing hypotheses. After all, con-
tent integration is happening somewhere. Although various alternative
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accounts have been proposed,3 it suffices for the purposes of this article
to understand that the general relevant alternative hypothesis is just that
some other module (or modular system) distinct from the language faculty
is responsible for the mind’s ability to integrate content (in the intended
sense). It should be kept in mind, however, that this alternative system
might be part of a larger cognitive system. Furthermore, any alternative
content integrator can likewise avail itself of translations into a ‘common
code’ so as to avoid the need to postulate a general-purpose inference
module (as this would run afoul of the massive modularity hypothesis).
Having noted the relevant competing hypothesis, I turn now to the em-
pirical evidence touted as support for the LACI hypothesis.
3.1. The Reorientation Data. The first set of data appealed to by Car-
ruthers comes from reorientation studies performed by Elizabeth Spelke
and her colleagues (Hermer and Spelke 1994, 1996; Shusterman and
Spelke 2005). These studies were designed to test human beings’ ability
to employ cross-modular content during reorientation tasks. Subjects were
placed in a rectangular room in which one of the walls was distinctively
patterned (e.g., there might be three white walls and one red wall), giving
the environment both geometric information (geometrically equivalent
corners) as well as object-property information (the red wall). Once in
the room, subjects watched as the experimenter hid an object in one corner
of the room. They were then disoriented. After disorientation, the subjects
were asked to relocate the object. The results showed that young children
generally failed to make use of the object-property information and in-
stead searched equally often in one of the two geometrically equivalent
corners. This indicates a predisposition to rely solely on geometric infor-
mation in cases of disorientation. However, adults and children older than
6 or 7 had no difficulty solving the tasks, presumably due to their use of
both types of information. Hermer and Spelke next tried to identify factors
predictive of subjects’ success. They found that success was not directly
correlated with age, nonverbal IQ, verbal working-memory capacity, size
of vocabulary, or comprehension of spatial vocabulary. Rather, the only
significantly correlated factor was the spontaneous use of spatial vocab-
ulary conjoined with object properties (e.g., “It is to the right of the blue
one”). Moreover, adults reported mentally rehearsing a sentence similar
to “It is left of the red wall,” to help them solve the task.4
3. Some have argued that the mind-reading system is what allows for content inte-
gration (Atran 2002; Nichols and Stich 2003). Alternatively, there might be a dedicated
content-integration system.
4. A follow-up study showed that training in the use of “left” and “right” greatly
improved the same subjects’ performance (Shusterman and Spelke 2005).
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Previously, Carruthers had been optimistic that these findings sug-
gested that their more developed language faculty is what enabled older
children and adults to integrate domain-specific information in order to
solve the task (2002). However, for various reasons, Carruthers’s revised
position (2006) is appropriately more skeptical of how much these results
actually support the LACI hypothesis.5 First, the sentence “It is left of
the red wall” does not involve any geometric information; it only conjoins
spatial information with object-property information. Therefore, the re-
sults do not demonstrate that language is integrating the output thoughts
from geometric and object-property modules. What is more, these tasks
can presumably be solved without entertaining any cross-modular
thoughts by entertaining information sequentially: first focusing on geo-
metric information to eliminate two of the possible corners and then using
object-property information to decide between the remaining two. In fact,
according to Carruthers, this is plausibly the method employed by chick-
ens, monkeys, pigeons, and fish; all of which are capable of solving similar
reorientation tasks despite their lack of language (Vallortigara, Zanforlin,
and Pasti 1990; Kelly, Spetch, and Heth 1998; Gouteux, Thinus-Blanc,
and Vauclair 2001; Sovrano, Bisazza, and Vallortigara 2002, 2005).
However, Carruthers does believe that these reorientation studies sug-
gest that language plays a constitutive role in our practical reasoning
processes (2006, 246–47). According to Carruthers, the fact that mentally
rehearsing the sentence “It is left of the red wall” helps subjects to solve
the task suggests that language is constitutive of our practical reasoning,
which presumably makes frequent use of content integration. Further-
more, Carruthers believes that slightly altered versions of these studies
could demonstrate that language is responsible for the generation of non-
domain-specific thoughts. He suggests that subjects might be placed in a
room with geometric properties more easily expressed in natural language,
such as “the acute corner.” Subjects could then simply rehearse sentences
such as “It’s in the acute corner near the red wall,” in order to solve the
task—and this sentence does contain concepts from both geometric and
object-property domains (247).
Unfortunately, there are further reasons why the reorientation data
do not provide support for the LACI hypothesis, and these reasons entail
that the further studies suggested by Carruthers will not either. The prob-
lem is that correlations between success on a reorientation task and vo-
calization (or mental rehearsal) of sentences combining information from
the relevant domains do nothing to show that language is responsible for
generating cross-modular thoughts. Rather, we can explain the correlation
5. One problem is that if young children’s attention was drawn to the red wall, they
showed increased success without altering their linguistic capacities.
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by the fact that subjects who are disposed to have thoughts combining
the information salient to the task will surely be found to more frequently
vocalize or mentally rehearse language expressing those cross-modular
thoughts. Classically construed, language is expressive of thought. Con-
sequently, increased use of sentences that combine geometric and object-
property concepts would suggest that a person is more frequently enter-
taining thoughts about those domains. Moreover, frequently vocalizing
and mentally rehearsing the relevant cross-modular sentences suggests that
an individual is more inclined to spontaneously draw associations between
those domains. Therefore, we can always explain the correlation in the
following way: using (i.e., vocalizing or mentally rehearsing) cross-mod-
ular language suggests that subjects are entertaining cross-modular
thoughts, which in turn explains their success on the reorientation task.
That is, entertaining more non-domain-specific thoughts is a common
cause of using more non-domain-specific sentences and more probable
success on the reorientation task, whether or not language is involved in
the generation of those thoughts. Therefore, correlations between spon-
taneous vocalization or mental rehearsal of sentences combining the rel-
evant domains and successful reorientation task performance can always
be explained in this way, regardless of where content integration is taking
place. Consequently, even if the same types of correlations were found in
future studies, this still would not show that language is responsible for
generating cross-modular thoughts. The correlations are just what we
should expect if content integration is performed elsewhere.
Nevertheless, we do require an explanation of why rehearsing natural
language sentences appears to help us solve practical reasoning tasks. Does
this require that language play a constitutive role in generating cross-mod-
ular thoughts during practical reasoning? No, it does not. These observa-
tions can be explained by the fact that contemporary human language—
and thus our language faculty—routinely employs certain inferences ca-
pable of generating cross-modular thoughts. Contemporary human lan-
guage routinely makes use of inferences that result in concept-integrated
sentences. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that whenever (or usually
when) the subsystems of the language faculty are activated so too is the
system responsible for the forms of inference employed by the language
faculty. This process can be actualized in one of two ways. Either the
language faculty is responsible for drawing its own inferences, or it makes
use of an external system capable of performing the required inferences.
However, regardless of which realization is true, rehearsing natural lan-
guage sentences will likely be beneficial in many problem-solving tasks.
This is because employing the subsystems of the language faculty pre-
sumably “turns on” the content-integration system as well. Therefore, we
should expect this strategy to be useful as long as rehearsing natural
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language sentences “turns on” a system whose inferences are responsible
for generating cross-modular thoughts, regardless of its location.6
3.2. Shadowing of Speech. The other source of evidence cited by Car-
ruthers is a study conducted by Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke, and Katsnelson
(1999) in which subjects were asked to solve the same types of reorien-
tation tasks, except that they were now asked to simultaneously shadow
speech (i.e., repeat back what they heard through headphones). In another
trial, subjects were asked to shadow rhythm with their hands while at-
tempting the same task. The results showed that shadowing of speech was
highly disruptive to subjects’ ability to solve the task, whereas shadowing
of rhythm had relatively little effect. A subsequent experiment showed
that shadowing speech did not disrupt subjects’ ability to use geometric
information or object-property information independently. According to
Carruthers, these results suggest that language is required for adults to
use content from the two domains (2006, 245).7
These results, however, are once again perfectly consistent with the
alternative hypothesis that content integration takes place outside of the
language faculty. Recall that in using the subsystems of our language
faculty we will presumably be making use of the (or a) content-integration
system. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that shadowing of speech
is sufficient to activate the content-integration (i.e., inference) system used
by natural language, thereby making it less available for use in other
tasks.8 If this is correct, then we should expect speech shadowing to disrupt
our abilities to integrate content in certain ways even if the language
faculty is not directly responsible for performing that task. That is, we
should expect the disruption regardless of where content integration takes
place. The shadowing of rhythm, however, does not employ content in-
tegration, and, thus, we should not expect it to cause any interference.
Therefore, once again, the results are predicted equally well by the hy-
pothesis that content integration is performed outside of the language
faculty.
6. Of course, language might be employed during practical reasoning for reasons apart
from content integration. However, other roles for language will not provide support
for Carruthers’s LACI hypothesis. I only wish to contend that if language is employed
for content-integration purposes, the language faculty is not required to perform any
content integration itself.
7. It is worth noting that entertaining information sequentially would appear to be
sufficient for solving these tasks as well.
8. Even though subjects will not be consciously processing the content, they will employ
the language faculty, which in turn will presumably activate the content-integration
system(s).
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4. Evidence Contrary to the Strong-LACI Hypothesis. I turn now to em-
pirical evidence that suggests that the strong-LACI hypothesis is false.
Much of what follows relies on the following assumption: if the strong-
LACI hypothesis were true (i.e., if the operations of the language faculty
were constitutively involved in the generation of all cross-modular
thoughts), then in the absence of a functioning language faculty we should
expect other systems believed to make use of cross-modular thoughts to
be detrimentally affected. Instead, we find that aphasics whose language
faculties are severely damaged are still able to use these other systems
quite effectively. Furthermore, aphasics appear to retain the ability to use
inferences identical to those licensed by natural language, despite the loss
of a functioning language faculty.
First, Rosemary Varley and her colleagues have studied an aphasic man
(S. A.) who has lost almost all of his linguistic capacities (Varley and
Siegal 2000; Varley, Siegal, and Want 2001; Varley 2002). S. A. displays
impairment across input and output processing modalities in sentence
parsing and verb comprehension. In fact, unlike most aphasics, S. A. has
apparently lost nearly all of his grammatical capabilities.9 Amazingly,
however, S. A. is still capable of performing at a high level on casual-
reasoning tasks and is able to attribute false beliefs to other individuals.
S. A. performed at near perfection on three different sets of false-belief
tests and scored perfectly on all causal-reasoning tests.10
Important for our discussion, the mind-reading system used in false-
belief tests is believed to use inferences similar to those Carruthers cites
as capable of generating cross-modular thoughts. For instance, it is be-
lieved that attributing false beliefs requires the ability to embed false
propositions into slots within true statements (e.g., MARY KNOWS THAT
JOHN (FALSELY) THINKS THERE IS CANDY IN THE BOOK; Astington and
Jenkins 1999). If this is correct, then the results demonstrate that S. A.’s
mind is capable of employing inferences used by natural language, despite
his severely damaged language faculty. This suggests that the language
faculty is not the exclusive resource for performing inferences that could
generate cross-modular thoughts.
Furthermore, being able to employ a human’s ‘theory of mind’ at least
sometimes involves entertaining cross-modular thoughts since our con-
specifics are capable of having cross-modular beliefs and desires. For
example, the mind-reading system might entertain the thought MY
9. On both spoken and written production and comprehension tasks, S. A. performs
at chance.
10. For example, S. A. was shown a picture of a car crash and three possible causes,
an alcoholic drink, a helicopter, and an ax. On 15 tests, S. A. correctly pointed to the
most likely cause of the event.
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brother KNOWS THAT JOHN FALSELY THINKS THAT HE cheated ON THE
TEST, which would plausibly integrate content from kinship and cheater
detection modules. Additionally, the causal reasoning system—which con-
nects events with their likely causes—is also likely capable of using
thoughts with cross-modular content (e.g., MY brother’s GRADES
CAUSED HIM TO cheat ON THE EXAM). What these results show is that
the loss of a functioning language faculty appears to have little effect on
the operation of these systems. Therefore, the results at least tentatively
suggest that the language faculty is not vital for the high functioning of
those systems despite their employment of cross-modular thoughts.
Moreover, studies involving subjects with primary progressive aphasia
(PPA) suggest that other central systems that employ cross-modular
thoughts are largely preserved when the language faculty is damaged. PPA
subjects showed preserved capabilities for various forms of practical rea-
soning despite the gradual loss of language capabilities (Wicklund, John-
son, and Weintraub 2004). However, it is unclear whether subjects are
using cross-modular thoughts when performing these tasks.
In addition, studies by Varley et al. demonstrate that agrammatic apha-
sics are also able to retain their capacities for various mathematical in-
ferences often claimed to require the resources of the language faculty
(2005). Agrammatic aphasics showed preservation of the ability to per-
form mathematical procedures involving recursiveness and structure-de-
pendent operations (e.g., solving problems involving brackets). Both of
these operations are believed to be features of natural language syntax.
These results suggest that either the systems for language and mathematics
have independent access to the same inference system or each has its own
inference system. More conclusively, these results suggest that the infer-
ences Carruthers attributes to the language faculty are sometimes per-
formed outside of the language faculty. Therefore, even if the language
faculty can execute the required inferences, it is unclear why we should
think that the language faculty is constitutive of the generation of all
cross-modular thoughts.
The empirical evidence surveyed here is insufficient to conclusively rule
out the strong-LACI hypothesis. However, the evidence does recommend
that the strong-LACI hypothesis is simply too strong to be likely to be
true. The data suggest that the loss of a functioning language faculty does
not disrupt other cross-modular systems, and the inferences used by nat-
ural language are not always performed within the language faculty. Fur-
thermore, these conclusions provide some motivation for doubting the
weak-LACI hypothesis as well. Regrettably, however, providing empirical
evidence directly concerning the weak-LACI hypothesis is currently ex-
tremely difficult. First, it is difficult to devise tasks that require a specific
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class of content-integrated thoughts. Second, it is difficult to pinpoint
precisely where content integration is taking place.
In sum, then, Carruthers’s data are unable to support either version of
the LACI hypothesis. Furthermore, the empirical evidence presented in
this section provides reasons for believing that both versions are false.
5. Additional Theoretical Considerations. I turn now to some more the-
oretical arguments concerning Carruthers’s LACI hypothesis. First, Car-
ruthers argues that there are straightforward reasons for the language
faculty to have developed the means to generate content-integrated
thoughts. Language presumably integrates sentences so as to express them
faster. As Carruthers puts it, “There is good reason to think that the
content-combining functions will come for free with the language module,
given the constraint of speed of sentence-production” (2006, 249). There-
fore, Carruthers contends, the advantages of faster communication pro-
vide reasons for thinking the language faculty would have developed the
ability to integrate content.
Carruthers is certainly correct that some types of integration are ex-
tremely useful for communication. However, content integration is a useful
tool for numerous other central systems, as well as the mind in general.
Numerous central systems, many of which provide significant survival
advantages (e.g., memory, mind reading, practical reasoning) benefit
greatly from their employment of various forms of content integration.
Therefore, each of these other systems would have analogous reasons to
have evolved its own content-integration systems. In addition, content
integration provides benefits to the mind in general. For one thing, a mind
capable of content integration will be more efficient since fewer resources
will be required to process and store information when it can be condensed
in content-integrated ways. These considerations suggest that the selection
pressures in favor of a content-integration system would have been strong
and multifaceted. Although it is advantageous to be able to communicate
the content of two thoughts within a single sentence, it is more advan-
tageous to be able to generate content-integrated thoughts that can be
used by various central systems and minimize processing and storage costs.
Therefore, it is likely that a system dedicated to content integration would
have evolved—or at the very least, Carruthers’s story makes it no more
likely that content integration would have evolved within the language
faculty than in any other system that benefits from the employment of
content integration.
What is more, it is unclear why the language faculty would have any
reason to generate thoughts with integrated content. Presumably, merely
being able to form concept-integrated sentences would equivalently in-
crease the speed of communication. Indeed, the ability to generate con-
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cept-integrated sentences is all Carruthers claims the inferences of the
language faculty were selected for. It is then up to the comprehension
subsystem of the language faculty to “pick up” those concept-integrated
sentences and translate them back into thoughts with integrated content.
But why should we think the language faculty has developed this bridge
between its production and comprehension subsystems for the purpose
of generating content-integrated thoughts? That is, there might be clear-
cut reasons for the language faculty to have developed the ability to
generate concept-integrated sentences. This, however, falls short of show-
ing that there are reasons for thinking the language faculty would have
developed the ability to generate content-integrated thoughts. Other sys-
tems, however, directly benefit from the employment of content-integrated
thoughts and would, therefore, appear to have more straightforward rea-
sons for having developed or co-opted the ability to generate those
thoughts.
One final consideration: even if language first gave rise to a particular
class of content-integrated thoughts, had a system exclusively dedicated
to content integration arose it would presumably have been selected for.
This is supported by the assumption that, in general, when two adaptive
problems (e.g., language and content integration) are present, having two
more specialized systems will be better than having a single more general
solution. Along these lines, not having to occupy various central systems
(e.g., language) in order to generate content-integrated thoughts would
presumably provide survival advantages. Furthermore, content integra-
tion is employed by so many central systems that it would be beneficial
to have one dedicated system rather than several distinct systems that
would need to replicate many of the same processes. Therefore, we should
plausibly expect the evolution of a dedicated (i.e., independent) content-
integration system.
6. Conclusion. Proponents of massive modularity must explain how a
pervasively modular mind can generate non-domain-specific thoughts by
integrating the content produced by domain-specific modules. The above
discussion demonstrates that Carruthers’s empirical evidence provides no
support for the hypothesis that the operations of the language faculty are
constitutively involved in any content integration. Furthermore, there are
empirical and theoretical reasons for rejecting both versions of the LACI
hypothesis. Therefore, future research concerning how content integration
is realized within a massively modular mind should be focused on systems
external to the language faculty.
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